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Faxing It In 
HOW CONGRESS FAILED CONSUMERS WITH THE 
JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past few years, the federal government’s 
regulation of telemarketing practices has enjoyed a front-and-
center position in the political spotlight.1  In 2003, consumers 
eagerly embraced the establishment of a national do-not-call 
registry,2 and in the same year, Congress enacted legislation to 
curb abusive email marketing practices.3  Both events 
exemplified an admirable4 commitment to furthering consumer 
 1 See, e.g., Consumers Served by Blocking Ads, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 25, 
2003, at 19 (“Responding to overwhelming public demand, our federal and state 
governments have recently enacted laudable new consumer protections against the 
frequent onslaught of unwanted direct marketing solicitations.”).  Such an increase in 
federal telemarketing regulation has even inspired new compliance technology.  
William C. Smith, Ensuring a Peaceful Dinner, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 8 
(discussing one company’s product that automatically blocks telemarketers from 
connecting to numbers currently listed on federal and state do-not-call registries). 
 2 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. III 2003)).  See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, (“FCC”), 
FCC-03-153, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 14-51 (2003), reprinted in 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,145 (July 
3, 2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/donotcall [hereinafter 2003 FCC Memo] 
(announcing implementation rules for a nationwide do-not-call list in conjunction with 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)).  Just three days into the national registry’s 
operation, more than ten million telephone numbers had been added to the do-not-call 
list.  FCC, DA 05-2056, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NAT’L DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY 2 
(2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/cbg/donotcall [hereinafter FCC Do-Not-Call 
Report].  By the release of the FCC’s first annual report, the number grew to 88 
million.  Id. 
 3 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. III 2003)) 
[hereinafter Can-Spam Act]. 
 4 Although the email spam legislation may have been an admirable first 
step, it has continued to receive much criticism.  See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Spam 
Mushrooms, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2004, at C1 (noting new research showed spam on 
the rise eight months after Can-Spam Act’s enactment); David McGuire, New Law 
Won’t Can Spam, Critics Say, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5943-2003Dec16.html (“Detractors say the Can-Spam Act 
will create a safe haven for e-mail marketers willing to follow certain rules for 
spamming.”).  The point here, however, is that Congress was at least making a good 
faith first step to appease consumers by creating an initial national regulation of email 
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protection against unsavory, invasive marketing tactics that 
flourished thanks to cheap, easy-to-use technology.  In 2005, 
however, Congress strayed considerably from this apparent 
trend of pro-consumer commitment when it enacted the Junk 
Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (“Junk Fax Prevention Act”).5  The 
Junk Fax Prevention Act, an amendment to a previous federal 
law prohibiting unsolicited marketing via facsimile machines, 
exposes fax machine owners to more unsolicited 
advertisements than allowed under the previous federal law.6   
Congress first addressed unsolicited faxed 
advertisements fifteen years ago as part of the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”).7  Among other 
provisions, the TCPA instituted a complete ban on unsolicited 
faxed advertisements sent without the “prior express invitation 
or permission” of the recipient.8  Such a strict prohibition 
against fax marketing differed from the TCPA’s more flexible 
regulation of telephone marketing.9  The justification behind 
the differential treatment between the telephone and the 
facsimile machine lay in the latter’s technological architecture.  
It simply was not fair to require consumers to swallow the 
costs—paper, ink, wear-and-tear on the machine—of 
automatically-received, unwanted faxes promising great hotel 
deals or special car wash discounts.10  Congress reasoned that 
the consumer protection rights of the fax recipient—who must 
unfairly waste time waiting while a machine receives and 
  
marketing.  As this Note discusses, Congress’s revision of its junk fax marketing 
regulations eroded strong federal statutory protection already in place. 
 5 The Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A § 227 (Supp. 2005)) [hereinafter Junk Fax Prevention Act]. 
 6 See infra discussion in Part V. 
 7 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 
2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)) [hereinafter TCPA]. 
 8 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (2000).  The statute defines unsolicited advertisement 
as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, 
goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior 
express invitation or permission.”  Id.  The TCPA fax provision states that “[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to use any telephone facsimile 
machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone 
facsimile machine[.]”  Id. § 227(b)(1)(C).  Thus, the prohibition does not apply to (1) 
faxed advertisements sent to recipients who have invited or permitted the sender to fax 
an ad or (2) faxes that do not include an ad. 
 9 See id. § 227(a)(3)(A)-(C).  The definition of telephone solicitation expressly 
offers three major classes of exemptions for calls and messages.  Id.  In contrast, the 
TCPA, as originally enacted, banned the faxing of all unsolicited advertisements.  Id. 
§ 227(b)(1)(C). 
 10 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10 (1991) (noting that fax machines “are 
designed to accept, process, and print all messages which arrive over their dedicated 
lines” (emphasis added)).  See also infra discussion in Part V.B. 
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prints out an unwanted transmission, all at the recipient’s 
cost—trumped any commercial speech rights of the 
marketers.11
Almost fifteen years after the TCPA’s enactment, 
Congress decided to revisit the TCPA fax provisions.  By then, 
fax machines had survived and surpassed their ‘80s business 
stereotype and found a place in the home, in addition to the 
office.12  Soon, faxing technology became a standard feature of 
personal computers and printers.13  Congress’s reexamination 
of fax marketing regulations resulted in the TCPA amendment, 
The Junk Fax Prevention Act.14  The amendment passed 
quickly and quietly compared with previous telemarketing 
laws,15  and unlike other consumer protection laws, the Junk 
Fax Prevention Act blossomed from the worries and needs of 
the business community instead of consumers.16  
The Junk Fax Prevention Act essentially codifies an 
“established business relationship” (“EBR”) exception to the 
  
 11 See TCPA, supra note 7, § 2(8) (“The Constitution does not prohibit 
restrictions on commercial telemarketing solicitations.”); S. REP. NO. 102-178, at *1971 
(1991) (“The [Senate] Committee [on Commerce, Science and Transportation] believes 
that [the reported bill] is an example of a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction on speech, which is constitutional. . . .  The Supreme Court has recognized 
the legitimacy of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech when the 
restrictions are not based on the content of the message being conveyed.”).  For the 
view that government regulation of advertising inhibits freedom of speech, see 
RICHARD T. KAPLAR, ADVERTISING RIGHTS: THE NEGLECTED FREEDOM (The Media 
Institute 1991) and MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
57-60 (Twentieth Century Fund 1989). 
 12 See, e.g., Judy Stark, The New Condo Amenities Are Towering Ideas, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 2, 2005, at 6F (noting that condo business centers are no 
longer considered amenities to buyers because “[n]ow almost everyone owns a 
computer and a printer/scanner/fax”); Leslie Berkman & Paul Herrera, Energy: Bigger 
Homes, Lifestyles Overshadow Conservation, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Oct. 23, 2005, at 
A1 (noting energy consumption in homes is increasing due in part to “home offices 
equipped with computers, printers and fax machines” (emphasis added)). 
 13 See infra discussion in Part V.B.  See also Sharon Crawford, Faxing in 
Windows XP, Oct. 21, 2002, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/using/setup/learn 
more/crawford_02october21.mspx (explaining how to fax using Windows XP 
technology). 
 14 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 2 (2005) (discussing the background for enacting the 
Junk Fax Prevention Act). 
 15 See infra discussion in Part IV.A on how quickly the bill passed.  Nearly 
nine months passed between the House’s introduction of its version of the TCPA and 
the signing of the TCPA into law.  The Can-Spam Act took eight months to pass after 
its introduction.  The Junk Fax Prevention Act took three months. 
 16 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 6 (explaining that legislation is needed to prevent 
“businesses [from being] subject to unforeseen and costly litigation unrelated to 
legitimate consumer protection aims” and citing “costs of training, making multiple 
contracts to obtain signatures providing consent, and obtaining permission for each fax 
machine when the recipients change location” as examples of business harms). 
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TCPA’s blanket ban on faxed advertisements sent without 
permission.17  A recipient has an EBR with a sender if the 
recipient currently interacts with or had previously interacted 
with the sender.18  Based on this past or present interaction, it 
is inferred that the recipient has given the sender, as well as 
the sender’s affiliates, permission to send faxed 
advertisements.19  Congress, as part of the TCPA, originally 
created the exception to apply only to telephone solicitations.  
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) later imputed 
the exception onto fax solicitations as part of its 
implementation of TCPA rules.20   
The EBR exception thrived for more than a decade 
despite the fact that the exception as applied to faxes 
contravened Congress’s intent for, and the express language of, 
the TCPA’s fax provision.21  In 2003, the FCC, recognizing this, 
planned to eliminate the exception it had erroneously created 
and announced new written consent requirements for 
unsolicited faxed advertisements.22  Businesses balked at the 
elimination of the exception and heavily lobbied Congress,23 
which reversed the FCC’s decision to eliminate the EBR by 
  
 17 Id. at 10. 
 18 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2002) for definition of “established business 
relationship.”  It should be noted that the definition’s use of “inquiry” and “application” 
are broad enough to include almost any interaction between a business and a 
consumer, regardless of whether money ever exchanges hands.  For example, a 
consumer who calls to ask a question, and who does not ever purchase or transact 
business with the company, now has an established business relationship with the 
company, and the company may begin sending unsolicited faxed advertisements. 
 19 See infra discussion in Part III.A. 
 20 FCC, FCC-92-443, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE 
TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 (1992), reprinted in 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/donotcall [hereinafter 1992 FCC Memo].  
 21 See infra discussion in Part III.B. 
 22 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 4. 
 23 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Assoc. of Prof’l Ins. Agents, Junk Fax 
Prevention Act Stalls in Congress (Dec. 14, 2004) (noting the association “will continue 
to lobby for the passage of a measure that achieves” the goal of restoring the 
established business relationship), available at http://www.pianet.com/IssuesOfFocus/ 
OngoingIssues/privacy/12-14-04-2.htm; Public Policy News: Update—“Do-Not-Fax” 
Rule, NEWSPAPER ASS’N OF AM., May 2005 (stating that a coalition of trade 
associations, including the Newspaper Association of America, petitioned the FCC to 
delay the elimination of the Fax EBR in order to allow Congress to pass legislation), 
available at http://www.naa.org/Government-and-Legal/Government-Affairs/Public-
Policy-News/NAA-Public-Policy-News-May-2005.aspx.  See also Bart T. Murphy, Death 
of the EBR Exemption May be “Greatly Exaggerated,” MODERN PRACTICE, November 
2004 (noting that “several associations began lobbying efforts to restore the EBR 
exemption” in anticipation of the FCC’s elimination), available at 
http://practice.findlaw.com/tooltalk-1104.html. 
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changing the EBR exception for faxed advertisements from an 
administrative ruling to statutory law.24
This Note argues that the Junk Fax Prevention Act fails 
in exactly what its title promises—namely, the prevention of 
junk faxes—by gravely undermining the strict prohibition 
against unsolicited fax marketing set out in its parent 
legislation, the TCPA.25  Part II of this Note discusses the 
legislative background and purpose of the TCPA fax 
regulations.  Part III details the creation of the TCPA’s various 
EBR exemptions and explains why the EBR exception for faxed 
advertisements (“Fax EBR”) should never have existed.  Part 
IV examines the FCC’s decision to eliminate the Fax EBR and 
Congress’s response to this elimination by way of the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act.  Part V argues that the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act fails to preserve the strong consumer protection set out in 
the TCPA, that modern faxing technology requires stricter 
telemarketing prohibitions, and that Congress should have 
given greater deference to the FCC’s decision to eliminate the 
Fax EBR.  Part V further posits that an inadequate federal law 
will effectively weaken current state laws that implement a 
strict prohibition against sending unsolicited advertisements 
via fax, similar to the TCPA as originally implemented.26  
Finally, Part VI explains that Congress should reinstate the 
strict ban on junk faxes because other avenues of law, 
including future Congressional review, a national do-not-fax 
  
 24 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 6 (2005) (“[T]he ‘Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005’ 
specifically creates a statutory exception from the general prohibition on sending 
unsolicited advertisements if the fax is sent based on an EBR[.]”).  One concern about 
this EBR codification is the weakening effect it will have on states with stricter fax 
marketing laws.  See infra discussion in Part VI for California’s response to the Junk 
Fax Prevention Act. 
 25 The “parent” aspect of the legislation takes on a double meaning when one 
considers that the Junk Fax Prevention Act, signed into law by President George W. 
Bush on July 9, 2005, has severely weakened the TCPA, signed into law by his father, 
President George H.W. Bush, on December 20, 1991.  See Law to Stop Junk Calls, 
NEWSDAY, Dec. 21, 1991, at 9 (noting President George W. Bush signed new 
telemarketing law).  
 26 The TCPA, and by extension, the Junk Fax Prevention Act, has no 
preemptive effect on state junk fax laws already in place that offer more protection 
than the TCPA, except the TCPA preempts certain technological requirements on 
telemarketing equipment.  47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (“State law not preempted. . . .  
[N]othing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shall 
preempt any State law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or 
regulations.”).  By contrast, the Can-Spam Act explicitly preempted all state email 
spam laws.  Can-Spam Act, supra note 3, § 8 (“This Act supersedes any statute, 
regulation or rule of a State . . . that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to 
send commercial messages . . . .”).  See infra discussion in Part V.C on how a weaker 
interstate fax rule effectively weakens stronger intrastate fax laws. 
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registry and state legislature response, would provide 
ineffective protection against consumer costs. 
II. THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 
A. Brief History of the TCPA 
The TCPA was an extensive, ambitious amendment to 
the Communications Act of 193427 that regulated the rapidly 
expanding and increasingly automated telemarketing 
industry.28  The Senate and House Reports addressing the 
TCPA29 emphasized the need to “protect the privacy interest of 
residential telephone subscribers,” as well as to facilitate 
interstate commerce.30  Congress also acknowledged its duty to 
consider the telemarketers’ interest in freedom of commercial 
speech.31  
What troubled Congress was not limited to the 
nuisances of a solicitor phoning too late in the evening or 
interrupting dinner with tempting offers of magazine 
discounts.  In fact, Congress reserved the strictest provisions 
for those types of human-less telemarketing practices that 
made it difficult for consumers to protest, such as automated 
dialing systems, pre-recorded messages and facsimile 
transmissions. 32  The TCPA’s legislative history makes a clear 
  
 27 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1934 Communications Act]. 
 28 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1969 (1991) (noting an increasing number of 
consumer telemarketing complaints due to “the increasing number of telemarketing 
firms in the business of placing telephone calls, and the advance of technology which 
makes automated phone calls more cost-effective”). 
 29 The finished TCPA was a combination of several bills introduced into 
Congress, including S. 1462 (Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act), S. 1410 
(Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act) and H.R. 1304 (Telephone Advertising 
Consumer Rights Act). 
 30 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1968.  Specifically, residential and business 
subscribers were concerned about automatic dialers tying up lines and preventing any 
outgoing calls, as well as automated calls that did not disconnect from the line even 
after the called party hung up the phone.  Id. 
 31 See id. at 1973 (“These regulations are consistent with the constitutional 
guarantee of free speech.”).  See also “Findings” in H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *2 (1991) 
(“Individuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial freedoms of 
speech and trade must be balanced in a way that protects the privacy of individuals 
and permits legitimate telemarketing practices.”). 
 32 See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1972 (“In addition, it is clear that automated 
telephone calls that deliver an artificial or prerecorded voice message are more of a 
nuisance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by ‘live’ persons.”).  In fact, 
an earlier version of the TCPA was titled “Automated Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act.”  Id. at 1970.  This distinction between these two types of telemarketing can be 
further inferred from that fact that the Direct Marketing Association and other groups 
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distinction between live in-person calls and new technologies 
that rendered human solicitors unnecessary.33
At the time of the TCPA’s enactment, more than forty 
states had implemented or were in the process of implementing 
legislation restricting or flat-out prohibiting telemarketing 
activity within the state, but these laws could not reach 
interstate telephone calls or faxes.34  The TCPA was created in 
part to address this gap in jurisdiction.35  In the case of a TCPA 
provision conflicting with a state telemarketing law, the 
stricter law would prevail.36  
The FCC opposed the TCPA, seeing no need for 
sweeping federal legislation regulating telemarketing 
activity.37  The agency argued that it preferred handling 
unsolicited marketing calls with “continued regulatory scrutiny 
and monitoring” without legislation.38  Congress, possibly 
skeptical of this contention because the FCC had previously 
declined to regulate unsolicited calls in 1980 and 1986,39 
ultimately passed the TCPA.  In the final bill, Congress 
included a provision that designated the FCC as a major 
interpreter of the TCPA.40  In this role, the FCC would later 
  
representing telemarketing companies that did not use automatic dialers or other 
equipment to make automated phone calls did not object to legislation targeting only 
the automated telemarketing industry.  Id. at 1971.  
 33 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10.  There was a special concern that 
certain automated systems endangered public safety by tying up phone lines of 
hospitals, emergency responders, and law enforcement agencies.  Id.  See also S. REP. 
NO. 102-178, at 1972 (“[I]t is legitimate and consistent with the constitution to impose 
greater restrictions on automated calls than on calls placed by ‘live’ persons.”). 
 34 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1970. 
 35 Id. at 1970 (“These [state] measures have had limited effect, however, 
because States do not have jurisdiction over interstate calls.  Many States have 
expressed a desire for Federal legislation to regulate interstate telemarketing calls to 
supplement their restrictions on intrastate calls.”). 
 36 47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2000).  Although the language of the preemption 
provision addresses only preemption of state laws affecting intrastate faxes that are 
less restrictive than the TCPA, the question has recently been raised whether states 
would have the ability to create a state law affecting both intrastate faxes and 
interstate faxes that cross their state lines.  See infra Part VI for discussion of 
California’s attempt to create a more restrictive junk fax law than the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act that would affect faxes entering or leaving California. 
 37 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1970 (quoting then-FCC Chairman Alfred C. 
Sikes). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (ordering the FCC “to prescribe regulations to 
implement the requirements of” TCPA provisions). 
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cause great controversy over its interpretation of the TCPA fax 
provision.41
B. The TCPA Fax Provision 
While the majority of the TCPA addressed the 
restriction of certain telephone marketing activities, the TCPA 
also prohibited the faxing of any unsolicited advertisements 
without “prior express invitation or permission.”42  The statute 
provided no definition of prior express invitation or permission, 
but the Congressional reports put the responsibility of 
determining the definition of the phrase “invited or given 
permission” on the telemarketers.43  No exceptions were carved 
out for unsolicited faxed advertisements in the statutory 
language—prior invitation or permission was a must.44   
The law allowed45 consumers to bring a private action in 
state court against violators of the TCPA fax provision, 
provided state laws or rules did not contradict such a right of 
action.46  State officials had the option to bring civil actions in 
federal court in the name of their citizens.47  If the recipient of 
  
 41 See infra discussion in Part III-IV. 
 42 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 
 43 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1975-76 (“While telemarketers will be responsible 
for determining whether a potential recipient of an advertisement, in fact, has invited 
or given permission to receive such fax messages, such a responsibility, is the 
minimum necessary to protect unwilling recipients from receiving fax messages that 
are detrimental to the owner’s uses of his or her fax machine.”).  Additionally, 47 
U.S.C. § 227(d) creates minimum technical identification standards for fax machines, 
including fax number identification and date/time stamps, but these standards are not 
relevant to this Note because they affect manufacturers of the machines, not 
advertisers who use the machines. 
 44 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227. 
 45 Although this section incorporates past tense language because it is 
describing the TCPA at the time of enactment, the Junk Fax Prevention Act had no 
effect on the penalty and cause of action provisions, which remain effective today.  See 
generally Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5. 
 46 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (allowing for an action “if otherwise permitted by the 
laws or rules of court of a State”).  There have been many battles over the permission 
provision as to whether it meant states had to officially opt-in legislation recognizing 
the TCPA’s authority through an affirmative action, whether states had to officially 
opt-out to reject the TCPA, or whether the language was merely an acknowledgement 
of the states’ ability to decide how their courts would handle TCPA claims.  Courts in 
early cases chose to adopt an “opt-out” approach, interpreting a state legislature’s 
silence on the TCPA as acceptance, while courts in more recent cases have embraced 
the “acknowledgement” meaning, arguing that such a meaning is the only way to 
maintain the balance between federal and state government.  For in-depth summaries 
of the three interpretations, see Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless 
Pers. Commnc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795-99 (M.D. La. 2004) and Chair King, Inc. v. 
GTE Mobilenet of Houston, 135 S.W.3d 365, 374-76 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 47 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(1). 
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an unsolicited faxed advertisement succeeded in showing a 
TCPA violation, the sender of the advertisement paid statutory 
damages: actual damages or $500 per fax.48  The penalty 
increased to $1500 per fax for those individuals or businesses 
willfully or knowingly sending unsolicited advertisements.49  
Again, at the time of enactment, there were no exceptions for 
the fax provision, so, theoretically, if a marketer mistakenly 
dialed the wrong fax number and transmitted an 
advertisement to an unintended consumer, the consumer could 
bring an action for $500.50
The two main reasons set out in the Congressional 
reports for such a strict prohibition against fax marketing51 
  
 48 Id. § 227(b)(3)(A)-(C). 
 49 Id. § 227(b)(3).  This statutory per-fax fine for willful violations can 
compound into an extremely expensive judgment if a company knowingly initiates 
risky advertising methods.  For example, a Georgia judge recently entered a $12 
million verdict against a Hooters restaurant for unsolicited faxes.  Eric Williamson, 
Hooters Hit with $11.9 Million Fee, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 1, 2001, at A07.  Hooters 
reportedly settled the case for $9 million.  Jeremiah Marquez, Court Rulings, Lawsuits 
Threaten to Unplug Junk Fax Industry, DETROIT NEWS/ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 6, 
2003 (noting that the Hooters award “was later reduced to about $9 million through a 
settlement”).  Fax.com, a third-party fax blasting company that sent huge volumes of 
faxed advertisements on behalf of companies, received the largest FCC-proposed fine in 
TCPA history—$5.37 million, or $11,000 for each of the 489 fax violations.  In re 
Fax.com, Inc., File No. EB-02-TC-120 (FCC 2002) (notice of apparent liability for 
forfeiture). 
 50 As consumer knowledge spread of the TCPA fax provision throughout the 
late ‘90s, there were a significant number of class action suits.  See Craig Anderson, 
Executive Fights Faxes, One at a Time, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 2005, at 3; Lisa Napoli, 
Crusaders Against Junk Faxes Brandish Lawsuits,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at C1.  
See also http://www.junkfaxorg.com for information on recent and current class action 
cases.  As a result of the possible immense fines, there have been many challenges by 
defendants over the eligibility of class action suits for TCPA violations.  Compare 
Kaufman v. ACS Sys., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 327 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding class action for 
TCPA fax violation permissible), and Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E.2d 
468, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that class certification for a TCPA violation was 
proper), with Carnett’s Inc. v. Hammond, 610 S.E.2d 529, 532 (Ga. 2005) (denying class 
certification for lack of commonality). 
 51 Most of the TCPA congressional reports are dedicated to telephone issues.  
Very little space or emphasis is given to the fax provisions.  In the official findings of 
the TCPA, “faxes” are not specifically mentioned.  See TCPA, supra note 7, § 2.  
Although not acknowledging faxes in the opening findings, the TCPA drafters noted in 
a legislative report that there were “tens of thousands of unsolicited messages per 
week” being sent to “facsimile machines across the country.”  H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 
*6-7 (1991).  This is not exactly a compelling number when compared with the fact that 
nearly 30 billion pages of faxes were being sent at the time of enactment.  Id. at *8.  It 
may be the case, however, that unsolicited advertisement statistics were not yet 
compelling because fax marketing was still a new business.  See Destination Ventures, 
LTD v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D. Or. 1994), aff’d, 46 F.3d 54, 57 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that the lack of “specific congressional concern for unsolicited fax 
advertising . . . may have more to do with the unprecedented medium of the facsimile 
rather than any lack of a substantial interest in the exploitation of that medium”).  
Clearly the explosive growth of third-party fax blasting companies in the mid-’90s 
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were the prevention of cost-shifting and invasion of privacy.52  
The cost-shifting theory is by far the strongest argument for a 
complete ban on unsolicited faxed advertisements.53  Every 
time an unsolicited faxed advertisement is sent to a recipient, 
the recipient’s machine suffers wear and tear, and the recipient 
is left footing the bill for paper and ink.54  The cost-shifting 
justification for the fax provision is sound due to the unique 
architecture of faxing technology, of which paper and ink are 
essential components.55
In contrast, the invasion of privacy reasoning applies to 
all types of telemarketing, no matter the specific technological 
  
justified Congress’s concern over unsolicited fax advertisements, especially as the fax 
machine enjoyed more regular residential use.  Julie Harnett, Host of Fresh 
Applications—Advances in Fax Systems, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at 6 (mentioning 
“the growth of fax broadcasting which is able to exploit both the unlimited database 
capabilities of a computer to target . . . potential customers around the world who have 
access to a standard fax machine”). 
 52 H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10. 
 53 Courts also supported the view that the cost-shifting feature of fax 
technology allowed for a complete ban on faxed advertisements sent without 
permission, even in light of the limited First Amendment protection allowed for 
commercial speech.  The complete ban on unsolicited fax advertisements, as opposed to 
the time, place, and manner regulation on telephone solicitations, led to many First 
Amendment challenges in courts.  See, e.g., Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 
323 F.3d 649, 659 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding a substantial government interest in 
preventing cost-shifting even if it means “some consumers will not receive unsolicited 
advertisements they might have appreciated”); Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 317 
(finding the government’s substantial interest in prevention of cost-shifting and 
allowing fax machine owners to control their equipment justified the commercial 
speech regulations); Destination Ventures Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(no violation of First Amendment); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 
1169 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (same).  Courts also noted other avenues were open to advertisers 
other than faxes sent without consent.  See, e.g., Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 317 
(“[T]he TCPA does not prevent advertisers from marketing their goods and services in 
a myriad of ways: television, radio, newspapers, magazines, billboards, mailings, the 
Yellow Pages, the Internet, and telephone calls as permitted by law, and faxes to 
consenting consumers.”). 
  There were other unsuccessful constitutional challenges, including the 
Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process.  See, e.g., Int’l Sci. & Tech. 
Inst. v. Inacom Comm’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1156-58 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
TCPA’s exclusive state court jurisdiction violated neither the Tenth Amendment nor 
the “equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”); 
Kenro, Inc., 92 F. Supp. at 1166 (holding that the $500 per fax statutory fine is not 
severe or oppressive enough to violate Due Process); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilenet 
of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 385 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding the TCPA did not 
exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power); Kaufman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325 (rejecting 
advertiser defendants’ “void-for-vagueness” arguments). 
 54 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10.  See also infra discussion in Part V.B. 
 55 There has been an argument that modern fax computer programs which 
allow for faxes to arrive directly to a computer desktop instead of printing 
automatically at a fax machine weaken the cost-shifting theory.  See infra discussion in 
Part V.B. 
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features, and thus, is Congress’s threshold argument for the 
TCPA’s enactment as a whole.56  When considering the TCPA 
as a whole, Congress seemed to view the telemarketing 
industry’s invasion of privacy as an attack of a fundamental 
right—the right not to receive unexpected, intrusive phone 
calls from solicitors.57  When presenting the invasion of privacy 
issue as it applied specifically to the fax provision, however, 
Congress viewed the invasion of privacy in a slightly different 
sense.  The privacy right thought to be infringed by unsolicited 
junk faxes was that of the recipient to use and control his or 
her own machine.  By protecting this right, Congress sought to 
prevent junk faxes from impeding or prohibiting the 
transmission of consumers’ legitimate business faxes. 58  Hence, 
even the invasion of privacy argument for prohibiting 
unsolicited faxed advertisements had an underlying economic 
theme. 
That is not to say the “fundamental right” privacy 
interest would not apply to the fax provisions, even if Congress 
did not specifically address them as such in the legislative 
history.  The same fundamental right to privacy interest 
Congress attaches in its report to automated telephone calls—
not being able to interact with the caller or not allowing the 
caller to feel the frustration of the called party59—can be easily 
applied to unsolicited faxed advertisements.60  Further, several 
courts later interpreting the policies behind the fax provisions 
of the TCPA supported the idea that unsolicited faxes were 
invasions of privacy, apart from impeding commerce.61
  
 56 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1969 (1991) (citing the first purpose of the bill is to 
“protect the privacy interests”). 
 57 Id. at 1977 (“The Supreme Court has recognized explicitly that the right to 
privacy is founded in the Constitution, and telemarketers who place telephone calls to 
the home can be considered ‘intruders’ upon that privacy.”). 
 58 H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10 (noting that an unsolicited faxed 
advertisement “occupies the recipient’s [sic] facsimile machine so that it is unavailable 
for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax”). 
 59 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1972 n.3 (citing comments from a consumer 
advocate that “slamming a phone down on a computer just does not have the same 
sense of release” compared to hanging up on a live in-person operator). 
 60 See Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 657 n.5 (8th Cir. 
2003) (“Artificial or prerecorded messages, like a faxed advertisement, were believed to 
have heightened intrusiveness because they are unable to interact with the customer 
except in preprogrammed ways.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 61 See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Lou Fusz Auto. Network, 401 
F.3d 876, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding unsolicited faxes were an “injury” within the 
meaning of an insurance contract because they invaded insured’s privacy); Adler v. 
Vision Lab Telecomms., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2005) (suggesting that a 
recipient who continually sends unsolicited faxes might be subject to a tort invasion of 
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Thus, Congress had two distinct policy reasons 
supporting the strict anti-junk fax provisions: preventing 
unfair cost-shifting from businesses to consumers and limiting 
invasion of consumer privacy.  As this Note discusses in Part V, 
these two goals complement the history and modern 
development of consumer protection law. 
III. THE ESTABLISHED BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTIONS 
A. Creation of the EBR Exception 
There are three “established business relationship” 
(“EBR”) exceptions related to the TCPA, each with its own 
distinct origin.  There is the telephone solicitation EBR 
exception (“Telephone EBR”) that originates from the TCPA 
statute language,62 the artificial and pre-recorded telephone 
solicitation EBR exception (“Artificial/Pre-Recorded EBR”) that 
derives from an FCC memo,63 and the Fax EBR that derives 
from a brief footnote in an FCC memo.64  Each will be discussed 
in turn. 
The “established business relationship” made its initial 
appearance in an early House of Representatives version of the 
TCPA as part of the definition of “unsolicited advertisement.”  
If that version had passed, the EBR would have been an 
exception for advertisements made via telephone and fax.65  
The finished version of the TCPA, however, explicitly limited 
the EBR exception to telephone solicitations only: 
The term “telephone solicitation” means the initiation of a telephone 
call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental 
of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is 
transmitted to any person, but such terms do not include a call or 
message 
  
privacy action); Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979 (D. 
Minn. 2002) (noting that a plaintiff who kept a fax machine at home for personal and 
business use “received fax advertisements between 4:15 a.m. and 7:15 a.m., intruding 
upon her privacy”); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilenet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 
365, 395 (Tex. App. 2004) (“[S]ending unauthorized fax advertising may constitute 
invasion of privacy in some circumstances.”). 
 62 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2000). 
 63 1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 18-20. 
 64 Id. at 28 n.87. 
 65 This is because “unsolicited advertisement” was a term that appeared in 
the fax provision.  As originally enacted, the fax provision did not prohibit all faxed 
advertisements from being sent; it prohibited the sending of an unsolicited 
advertisement without prior express invitation or permission.  See supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
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(A) to any person with that person’s prior express 
invitation or permission, 
(B) to any person with whom the caller has an established 
business relationship, or 
(C) by a tax exempt nonprofit organization.66
Congress did not define “established business 
relationship” in the statute.67  The FCC subsequently created a 
definition of “established business relationship” in its initial 
1992 rulemaking memo: 
The term “established business relationship” means a prior or 
existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication 
between a person or entity and a residential subscriber with or 
without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, 
application, purchase, or transaction by the residential subscriber 
regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, and 
relationship has not been previously terminated by either party.68
The Telephone EBR was the only reference to an established 
business relationship in the TCPA when it was signed into 
law.69
By contrast, the Artificial/Pre-Recorded EBR did not 
originate in the TCPA language.70  The TCPA language did, 
however, order the FCC to implement rules in conjunction with 
the TCPA provisions on calls using artificial or pre-recorded 
voices.71  Specifically, the FCC had to consider two possible 
exemption groups to the prohibition against pre-recorded calls: 
(1) calls that were not made for a commercial purpose and (2) 
calls that were made for a commercial purpose but that did not 
adversely affect the privacy rights the TCPA was intended to 
protect and did not include the transmission of any unsolicited 
  
 66 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 
 67 See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1975-76 (1991). 
 68 1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 42.  The FCC specifically rejected a 
company-specific list as part of the EBR definition (such as allowing “public utilities” to 
be automatically exempted) and rather adopted a broad enough definition to include 
most businesses.  Id. at 19-20.  The FCC also decided not to include a time limit for the 
expiration of an EBR.  Id. at 20.  Further, the FCC rejected narrowing the EBR to a 
current business relationship, thereby making a prior business relationship a 
qualifying EBR.  Id. at 20.  An EBR, however, ceased to exist at the request of the 
consumer.  Id. at 20.  The broad language of this definition is further discussed infra in 
Part V. 
 69 See generally TCPA, supra note 7. 
 70 1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 18-20. 
 71 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 
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advertisement.72  Based on these orders, in its initial 1992 rule-
making TCPA memo, the FCC determined that it was feasible 
to extend the established business relationship exemption to 
pre-recorded commercial calls because the exemption met 
Congress’s necessary criteria.73  According to the FCC’s 
analysis, using pre-recorded calls to solicit someone with whom 
one has a prior or existing business relationship does not 
adversely affect privacy interests of the called party.74  The 
FCC further determined pre-recorded commercial calls based 
on an established business relationship could not include an 
unsolicited advertisement because the advertisement “can be 
deemed to be invited or permitted by a subscriber in light of the 
business relationship.”75  Equating an established business 
relationship with permission to send advertisements seems a 
wrong conclusion, however, given that the statutory provision 
defining telephone solicitation presents an established business 
relationship and prior express permission as two distinct 
exemptions.76
The Fax EBR’s origin is much humbler by comparison; 
it came to life in a footnote of the same 1992 FCC memo.77  The 
only explanation for the FCC extending its already extended 
exception to include unsolicited faxed advertisements is a 
reference to its previous—and, arguably, erroneous—discussion 
involving pre-recorded phone calls.78  Ironically, in the same 
footnote, the sentence before the one announcing the Fax EBR 
states, “In banning telephone facsimile advertisements, the 
TCPA leaves the Commission without discretion to create 
exemptions from or limit the effects of the prohibition . . . .”79  
Nevertheless, for almost a decade, the courts fully embraced 
  
 72 Id. § 227(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 73 1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 19. 
 74 Id.  The FCC memo makes no further explanation of exactly how this does 
not constitute an invasion of privacy.  Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3)(A)-(B) (“Telephone solicitation . . . does not include a 
call or message . . . to any person with that person’s prior express invitation or 
permission” or “to any person with whom the caller has an established business 
relationship . . . .”). 
 77 1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, at 28 n.87 (“We note, however, that 
facsimile transmission from persons or entities who have an established business 
relationship with the recipient can be deemed to be invited or permitted by the 
recipient.”). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the FCC-created Fax EBR as a legitimate exception to the 
TCPA’s ban on unsolicited faxed advertisements.80
B. Why the Fax EBR Should Have Never Existed 
The FCC should have never created the Fax EBR 
because it was never Congress’s intent to include one.  This is 
clear for two reasons.  First, the TCPA legislative history 
explicitly rejected a Fax EBR.81  Second, the FCC-created Fax 
EBR is contrary to the language of the TCPA.82
The legislative history supports the argument that 
Congress never intended to create a Fax EBR.  Congress 
specifically rejected adopting an EBR exception as part of the 
definition of unsolicited advertisement, which would affect both 
telephones and faxes, and, instead, chose to limit its use to 
telephone solicitations only.83   
Second, the Fax EBR is contrary to the language of the 
TCPA.  The TCPA prohibits using a fax machine to send an 
unsolicited advertisement.84  The definition of unsolicited 
advertisement is one that is “without that person’s prior 
express invitation or permission.”85  Therefore, the FCC’s 
conclusion that the Fax EBR is sufficient because it indicates 
an inferred or implied permission contradicts Congress’s 
requirement that the permission be “express.”  Further 
evidence of Congress’s intent not to create any exemptions for 
its strict prohibition against unsolicited faxed advertisements 
is the fact that it did not include language asking the 
Commission to consider implementing rules regarding one, as 
it had for pre-recorded calls.86   
Two recent court cases raised this express-inferred issue 
as well.  In Carnett’s, Inc. v. Hammond,87  plaintiff Michelle 
Hammond brought a class action suit in Georgia against a car 
wash company, which had hired an ad agent to fax 73,500 
  
 80 See Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns, 
L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 808 (M.D. La. 2004) (noting the FCC’s “longstanding 
interpretation” of its established business relationship exception lasted more than ten 
years); McGarry v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 599 S.E.2d 34, 36-37 (Ga. App. 2004) 
(noting the long history of the FCC’s established business relationship exception). 
 81 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text. 
 83 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
 84 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
 85 Id. § 227(a)(1)(4) (emphasis added).  
 86 See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. 
 87 610 S.E.2d 529 (Ga. 2005). 
360 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
unsolicited advertisements to Atlanta-area residents, including 
Hammond.88  The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the 
appellate court’s finding that there was no evidence that the 
car wash company had express permission to fax the 
recipients.89  The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed regarding 
the lack of permission, citing the possibility that some of the 
recipients had an “established business relationship” with the 
local car wash.90  Hammond argued that the established 
business relationship exemption did not exist because it was 
“contrary to the clear statutory language of the TCPA.”91  The 
court, however, said it had an obligation to accept FCC 
regulations as valid.92
In Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc.,93  
a Texas appellate court appeared more open to the language 
argument against allowing a Fax EBR exemption.  In Chair 
King, the plaintiff was a customer of the defendant, who had 
sent unsolicited faxes to the plaintiff.94  The court openly 
questioned the soundness of the FCC’s established business 
relationship.95  It noted that deeming permission on an 
inference seemed to conflict with the TCPA’s requirement of 
express permission.96  The court continued by forcefully stating 
that “[c]haracterizing permission granted by implication as 
‘express’ runs afoul of the plain meaning of the word.”97  
Ultimately, the court determined plaintiff had raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether he gave prior express 
invitation or permission.98
Finally, the TCPA definition of telephone solicitation 
offers a choice between an established business relationship 
and express permission.99  This statutory distinction shows 
that Congress did not see an established business relationship 
and permission as interrelated options.100  Thus, the legislative 
  
 88 Id. at  529-30. 
 89 Id. at  531. 
 90 Id. at 532. 
 91 Id. at  531. 
 92 Carnett’s, Inc., 610 S.E.2d at 531.  
 93 135 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 94 Id. at 370. 
 95 Id. at 394. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2000). 
 100 Id.  See supra discussion in Part III.A. 
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history and language of the TCPA support the argument that 
the FCC erroneously created the Fax EBR.  It was the 
distinction between express and inferred permission, coupled 
with continuing consumer complaints about cost and privacy, 
that persuaded the FCC to eliminate the Fax EBR more than a 
decade after the agency had created it in a memo footnote.101
IV. THE JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005 LEGITIMIZES 
THE FAX EBR EXCEPTION 
A. History and Passing of the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 
2005 
In July 2003, the FCC released a sweeping 164-page 
study on the TCPA rules it had enacted during the past 
decade.102  As part of this overhaul, in addition to announcing 
plans to implement a national do-not-call registry, the FCC 
reversed its stance on the Fax EBR it created in its 1992 initial 
rule-making memo.103  In making this decision, the FCC 
emphasized that it wished to prohibit cost-shifting from the 
advertiser to the consumer, as well as to limit the intrusiveness 
of unsolicited faxed advertisements.104  In particular, the FCC 
found that consumers paid out of pocket not only for wasted ink 
and paper but also for lost labor costs.105  In this same memo, 
the FCC maintained the Telephone EBR because it did not 
impose the same type of costs as faxing technology.  The FCC, 
however, decided to put a time limit on the Telephone EBR, 
ruling that a Telephone EBR expires eighteen months after the 
last purchase or three months after a consumer’s last inquiry 
about a product.106  In support of narrowing the Telephone EBR 
definition, the FCC cited “confused and even frustrated” 
  
 101 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 112-15. 
 102 See generally 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2. 
 103 Id. at 4. 
 104 Id. at 111-12 (noting consumers’ additional burden of “time spent reading 
and disposing of faxes, the time the machine is printing an advertisement and is not 
operational for other purposes, and the intrusiveness of faxes transmitted at 
inconvenient times, including in the middle of the night”).  One court rejected a 
defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim should fail because 
plaintiff should have turned his fax machine off at night to avoid interruptions.  Adler 
v. Vision Lab Telecomms., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 n.11 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 105 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 111-12 (noting time spent collecting and 
sorting faxes increases labor costs). 
 106 Id. at 65. 
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consumers who receive phone calls from companies they have 
not contacted or done business with for many years.107
When the FCC reported the elimination of the Fax EBR, 
it announced that “prior express invitation or permission” must 
be shown through a written, signed statement that lists the fax 
number to which the consent refers.108  In other words, every 
business that wanted to engage in sending unsolicited faxed 
advertisements would need to collect signed, written consent 
before beginning any fax marketing campaign.  The 
elimination of the Fax EBR exemption was set to take effect on 
August 25, 2003—just thirty days after the FCC’s rules first 
appeared in the Federal Register.109
Understandably, members of the business community 
were concerned about the cost and time it would take to collect 
signed, written consent.  In response, the FCC delayed the 
implementation of the Fax EBR elimination until January 1, 
2005 to allow businesses ample time to adjust to the new 
regulations.110  By the time January 1, 2005 arrived, trade 
organizations had begun to lobby Congress, which started work 
on what would later pass as the Junk Fax Prevention Act.111  In 
light of this impending legislation, the FCC agreed, once more, 
to extend the Fax EBR elimination to July 1, 2005.112  
In early April 2005, Representative Gordon Smith (D-
OR) introduced the Junk Fax Prevention Act to the Senate, and 
the Senate then referred the bill to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.113  With the FCC’s 
elimination of the Fax EBR and its rule of signed, written 
consent set to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act earned Senate and House approval at lightning 
  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id. at 112.  Interestingly, Congress specifically rejected a written consent 
requirement for “prior express consent” in relation to automated telephone calls in the 
TCPA legislative history.  S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1971 (1991) (“[T]he reported bill does 
not include the requirement included in the bill as introduced the requirement that 
any consent to receiving an automated call be in writing.”). 
 109 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 128 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 4 (2005). 
 110 FCC, FCC 03-208, ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 3 (2003), 
reprinted in 68 Fed. Reg. 50,978 (Aug. 18, 2003). 
 111 Effective Date Delayed, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,816 (Oct. 28, 2004). 
 112 Id. (“[W]e believe the public interest would best be served by delaying the 
effective date of the written consent requirement for six months to allow Congress to 
act.”). 
 113 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 7. 
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speed.114  In fact, the House—which had a heavy hand in 
shaping the original TCPA legislation115—did not meaningfully 
debate any aspect of the Junk Fax Prevention Act.116  The 
House introduced and passed the bill by voice vote in less than 
a half-hour.117  Despite the House’s hurried efforts to meet the 
FCC’s July 1 deadline, the bill had yet to be signed by 
President George W. Bush (and thus was still not law), so the 
FCC delayed the effective date—again—from July 1, 2005 until 
January 9, 2006. 118  Finally, President George W. Bush signed 
the Junk Fax Prevention Act on July 9, 2005, thus amending 
and undermining the extensive consumer protection legislation 
signed by his father, George H.W. Bush.119
B. Congress’s New Version of “Established Business 
Relationship”—The Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005’s 
New Consent Requirements 
The Junk Fax Prevention Act’s main effect is to make 
the Fax EBR a statutory exemption against the sending of 
unsolicited faxed advertisements.120  The Junk Fax Prevention 
Act’s statutory definition of Fax EBR reverts to the broad 
definition found in the 1992 FCC memo.121  Congress explicitly 
did not adopt the 2003 revised Telephone EBR, which included 
a time limit on the established business relationship.122  But 
  
 114 For a summary of the bill’s history on the Library of Congress’s website, 
visit http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN00714:@@@X. 
 115 The House had introduced one of the bills incorporated into the final 
TCPA.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 116 See generally 151 CONG. REC. H5262-65 (daily ed. June 28, 2005).  Only the 
bill’s three co-sponsors spoke about the Junk Fax Prevention Act.  No senator 
expressed dissenting or critical opinions.  Id.  The House did have a more active role in 
a previous Fax EBR bill in 2004 that failed to become law.  Id. at H5264. 
 117 Id. at H5261-67 (recording the bill’s passing between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00 
a.m. on June 28, 2005).  This was just two days before the effective date of the FCC’s 
elimination of the Fax EBR.  See supra notes 111-12. 
 118 Effective Date Delayed, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,705 (June 30, 2005).  The Junk 
Fax Prevention Act of 2005 would pass just nine days after this announcement. 
 119 President Signs Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, FED. INFO. AND NEWS 
DISPATCH, July 11, 2005. 
 120 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 1 (2005) (citing its first purpose as to “[c]reate a 
limited statutory exception” for Fax EBRs). 
 121 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(b) (ordering the definition of 
established business relationship to revert back to the meaning before the one enacted 
by the 2003 FCC Memo). 
 122 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10 (“[T]his provision would specifically exclude the 
18/3 time limits that are in the current definition of ‘established business relationship’ 
in the C.F.R. . . .   Therefore, the effect would be to reinstate the junk fax rules back to 
the FCC’s original interpretation established in 1992.”). 
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the Junk Fax Prevention Act adds additional limitations to the 
EBR exception, including the method in which the sender 
obtained the recipient’s fax number.123  The Junk Fax 
Prevention Act requires that the fax number be obtained either 
through 
(I) the voluntary communication of such number, within the context 
of such established business relationship, from the recipient of the 
unsolicited advertisement, or 
(II) a directory, advertisement, or site on the Internet to which the 
recipient voluntarily agreed to make available its facsimile number 
for public distribution [except that this clause does not apply to 
numbers collected as part of an EBR before the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act enactment.]124
Thus, if a fax sender and recipient fall within the broad, 
no-time limit Fax EBR definition, the sender may fax 
unsolicited advertisements if the recipient gave the sender the 
fax number pursuant to a business inquiry or transaction or if 
the fax number is otherwise made public.125   
As part of the statutory Fax EBR exemption, the Junk 
Fax Prevention Act sets out several compliance requirements.  
In an attempt to balance the needs of consumers and 
businesses, the Junk Fax Prevention Act now requires 
advertisers wishing to send an unsolicited faxed advertisement 
based on an EBR between sender and recipient to include 
identification information on the front page of a fax, including 
name of sender and telephone or fax information for consumers 
to opt out of future unsolicited faxes.126  Specifically, senders 
must offer at least one cost-free mechanism available twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week for consumers to make opt-
out requests.127  The opt-out notice also must include a 
  
 123 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(a). 
 124 Id. 
 125 See infra discussion in Part V.A on why this “public distribution” fax 
number provision weakens consumer protection. 
 126 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c).  For a discussion on why this 
unfairly puts the burden on consumers, see infra Part.V. 
 127 It is unclear from the statutory language whether an email address or 
website would constitute a cost-free mechanism.  As part of its rules implementing the 
Junk Fax Prevention Act, the FCC stated that an email address or website would 
satisfy the cost-free requirement.  FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION FCC-06-42, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
OF 1991 15-16 (2006), reprinted in 71 Fed. Reg. 25, 967 (May 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/policy/faxadvertising.html.  Also, the Junk Fax Prevention Act 
orders the FCC to determine whether small businesses should be able to forgo the cost-
free mechanism requirement due to small businesses’ heavy reliance on faxed 
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statement telling the recipient that consumers may opt out of 
future unsolicited advertisements and that it is unlawful for 
fax senders to not timely comply with opt-out requests.128  
Another change in consent that the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act makes is a small but telling one.  Now, the 
definition of unsolicited advertisement refers to an ad 
transmitted without the recipient’s “prior express invitation or 
permission, in writing or otherwise.”129  The addition of “in 
writing or otherwise” shows Congress deemed verbal consent 
sufficient.  Therefore, Congress rejected the FCC’s written, 
signed consent rule.130   
Thus, Congress’s Fax EBR is a slightly more specific 
exemption than the FCC’s 1992 Fax EBR in that Congress 
attempted to narrow the Fax EBR’s definition by limiting the 
source of fax numbers senders may use pursuant to a Fax 
EBR.131  In a seemingly contradictory move to narrowing the 
definition, however, Congress refused to adopt an expiration 
date for the Fax EBR.132  Another difference from the FCC’s 
Fax EBR is Congress’s notice requirements to educate 
consumers about their right to refuse future junk faxes using 
cost-free mechanisms.133  Despite the consumer-friendly opt-out 
notices, however, Congress’s version of the Fax EBR does little 
to protect consumers from cost-shifting and invasions of 
privacy.134  
  
advertisements.  S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10.  The “cost-free” mechanism is arguably the 
only consumer-friendly part of the legislation.  To allow small businesses to be exempt 
from the cost-free mechanism would undermine consumer protection even more than 
the Junk Fax Prevention Act does as it passed because small businesses are likely to 
rely on junk fax as the preferred advertising method of choice because it is more cost-
effective.  Id. at 3 (“Industry comments maintained that ‘faxing is a cost-effective way 
to reach customers’ particularly for small business from whom faxing is a cheaper way 
to advertise.”). 
 128 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c) (“[T]he notice states that the 
recipient may make a request to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement not to 
send any future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or 
machines and that failure to comply, within the shortest reasonable time, as 
determined by the Commission, with such a request . . . is unlawful.”). 
 129 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(g) (emphasis added). 
 130 See infra discussion in Part V. 
 131 See infra text accompanying notes 161-63 for why the “limit” on source of 
fax numbers is not an effective limit.  
 132 See supra note 122. 
 133 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c) 
 134 See infra discussion in Part V. 
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V. DISCUSSION—WHY THE JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT 
FAILS AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE TCPA 
Consumers should not be misled by the cleverly titled 
amendment.  The Junk Fax Prevention Act does little to 
prevent the junk faxes that the TCPA strictly prohibited.  This 
is due to Congress’s broad, no-expiration definition of Fax EBR, 
its reliance on a company-specific opt-out provision that 
continues to shift costs to consumers, and its decision to allow 
for the collection of numbers based on a Fax EBR from public 
databases.135  Additionally, the cost-shifting effects of a 
facsimile machine’s unique technology remain today, even in 
light of new, computer-based faxing capabilities.136  This new 
federal law also puts state laws offering stronger protection 
against junk faxing in jeopardy.137  Finally, Congress could 
have struck a better balance between consumer and business 
needs by showing more deference to the FCC and its decision to 
eliminate an exception of its own creation because the FCC had 
more first-hand experience dealing with and spent more time 
studying the issue.138
A. Congress’s Broad, No-Expiration Fax EBR Weakens The 
Strong Consumer Protection Set Out In The TCPA 
The history of modern state and federal consumer 
protection law stems from the desire to shield consumers from 
economic loss as a result of deception, fraud or other abuses in 
commerce.139  For example, consumer protection law guards 
against a used car salesman who turns the odometer back to 
make an auto seem to have less wear-and-tear.140  Gradually, 
  
 135 See infra discussion in Part V.A. 
 136 See infra discussion in Part V.B. 
 137 See infra discussion in Part V.C. 
 138 See infra discussion in Part V.D. 
 139 See Spencer Weber Waller, In Search of Economic Justice: Considering 
Competition and Consumer Protection Law, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 633 (2005) (noting 
modern consumer protection covers unfair advertising, “outright fraud,” consumer 
credit, and debt collection, among other things). 
 140 Jones v. West Side Buick Auto Co., 231 Mo. App. 187, 195-96 (1936).  See, 
e.g., Hebe Co. v. Calvert, 246 F. 711, 716-17 (S.D. Ohio 1917) (upholding state’s ability 
to protect consumers from deceptively labeled milk).  In 1938, Congress amended the 
Federal Trade Commission’s responsibilities to include regulation of unfair and 
deceptive trade practices.  Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111.  For an in-
depth history of the Federal Trade Commission, see Mark Winerman, The Origins of 
the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 
(2003). 
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the doctrine of consumer protection law expanded from solely 
economic protection to protections against business methods 
that constituted nuisance141 and threatened privacy,142 
including marketing techniques.  For example, in Breard v. 
Alexander,143 the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance that 
prohibited door-to-door commercial solicitation without prior 
consent.144  The ordinance originated from unhappy citizens 
who deemed such commercial visits an “uninvited intrusion 
into the privacy of their home.”145  While the Court decided this 
case before commercial speech received First Amendment 
protection146 in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc.,147 the Court never shied away 
from the idea that a citizen’s privacy is a valid interest for 
  
 141 Larson v. State, 97 So. 2d 776, 786, 789-91 (Ala. 1957) (upholding an 
injunction against loan creditors’ business practice deemed to be a public nuisance). 
 142 Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that city transit system policy of forbidding political 
advertisements on city buses should be upheld because “the right of the commuters to 
be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its 
vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this 
captive audience”).  In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ Harvard Law Review 
article famously drew early attention to the issue of privacy by calling for a new tort 
action for invasion of privacy.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (“Recent inventions and business methods call 
attention to the next step that must be taken for the protection of the person, and for 
securing the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right ‘to be let alone.’”).  For 
historical significance of this article, see Daniel J. Solove, The Origins and Growth of 
Information Privacy, 838 PLI/Pat 23, 34-35 (May-June 2005).   
 143 341 U.S. 622 (1951), overturned by Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 641-45 (1980). 
 144 Breard, 341 U.S. at 625. 
 145 Id.  The Court noted that, “[t]here is equal unanimity that opportunists, for 
private gain, cannot be permitted to arm themselves with an acceptable principle, such 
as that of a right to work, a privilege to engage in interstate commerce, or a free press, 
and proceed to use it as an iron standard to smooth their path by crushing the living 
rights of others to privacy and repose.”  Id. at 625-26. 
 146 The Court refused to hear a First Amendment argument against the city 
ordinance, saying “[o]nly the press and oral advocates of ideas could urge this point.  It 
was not open to solicitors of gadgets and brushes.”  Id. at 641.  
 147 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding a consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information was entitled to First Amendment protection).  The Court later 
clarified that commercial speech receives a limited First Amendment protection that 
must only pass intermediate scrutiny. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).  Recent members of the Court have 
questioned the logic in offering less protection based on the commercial content of 
speech, suggesting that it receive full First Amendment protection.  See Adam Zitter, 
Note, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2794-96 (2004) (discussing recent Supreme Court commercial 
speech cases). 
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states to protect through legislation148 or that commercial 
speech is subject to privacy limitations.149  Thus, the two main 
policies behind the TCPA fax regulations—cost-shifting and 
privacy—complemented the development of consumer 
protection law.150  The drafters of the Junk Fax Prevention Act 
should not have blatantly brushed off such well-established 
policies in favor of making it easier for businesses to market 
their products through a particular method. 
There are several ways Congress brushed off consumer 
protection policies.  First, the drafters refused to adopt a time 
limit for the Fax EBR.  Congress chose to keep its Fax EBR 
similar to the original 1992 FCC definition.151  This language—
“interaction” or “application”—is broad enough to encompass 
almost any consumer interaction, past or present, with a 
business.152  When coupled with the fact that this interaction or 
application could have conceivably happened twenty years ago 
and still count as a Fax EBR, it severely cuts against any 
consumer protection rhetoric in the law’s title.  Not having any 
time limit on a broad definition clearly did not suit the 
Telephone EBR, which is why the FCC chose in 2003 to limit 
the Telephone EBR to eighteen months from last purchase or 
three months from the last consumer inquiry.153  Again, 
  
 148 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (“The State’s interest in 
protecting the well-being, tranquility and privacy of the home is certainly of the 
highest order in a free and civilized society.”).  For purposes of this footnote, the term 
“privacy” refers to privacy as a fundamental right that emerged through Constitutional 
doctrine and not to the tort of intrusion against seclusion. 
 149 These privacy limitations on commercial speech are usually referred to as 
“time, place, and manner” restrictions.  See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748: 
In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of 
course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way.  Some forms of 
commercial speech regulation are surely permissible . . . .  There is no claim, 
for example, that the prohibition on prescription drug price advertising is a 
mere time, place, and manner restriction.  We have often approved 
restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information. 
Id. at 770-71. 
 150 See supra text accompanying notes 51-62. 
 151 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10 (“[T]he effect would be to reinstate the junk fax 
rules back to the FCC’s original interpretation established in 1992. . . .”). 
 152 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 153 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 65-66.  Compare 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) 
(2002), with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(3) (2003). 
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Congress explicitly rejected adopting the time limit for the Fax 
EBR.154
A second example of how Congress ignored consumer 
protection policies is its choice to include a company-specific 
opt-out mechanism.155  Supporters of the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act are likely point to the opt-out provision and its required 
cost-free mechanism as an indication of Congress’s desire to 
protect consumers.156  While it is true that giving consumers 
the power to more effectively identify their purported 
unsolicited fax origins is consumer friendly, allowing company-
specific opt-out lists still unfairly shifts costs to consumers 
because it allows for that first fax to clog up their machines and 
to waste their ink and paper.157  This is in addition to the labor 
costs and nuisances involved in contacting each sender to be 
removed from lists.158  Ironically, Congress found that allowing 
company-specific do-not-call lists failed to protect consumers 
from invasive telemarketing calls and enacted a law to create a 
national do-not-call registry.159  It is unclear why Congress 
thought a company-specific list would be effective for faxes.160  
  
 154 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 10.  But Congress did give the FCC the authority to 
examine at a later date whether a time limit would be appropriate.  Junk Fax 
Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(f). 
 155 See Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c). 
 156 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 7 (noting the new law provides a cost-free 
mechanism so recipients would be able “to stop future unwanted faxes sent pursuant to 
[a Fax EBR]”). 
 157 See Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. 01-0004360, 
2003 LEXIS 29, *11 (D.C. Super. Apr. 17, 2003) (rejecting a company-specific do-not-
fax approach because it would “still allow a fax advertiser to send one fax to every fax 
number for which the recipient would have to bear the cost.  Moreover, the consumer 
would still have to bear the cost and the burden of receiving at least on [sic] fax and 
then contacting the sender of the unsolicited fax to be removed from the database.  As 
we have seen from this case, this may still not immediately stop the unwanted faxes”). 
 158 This is because the Junk Fax Prevention Act opt-out provision is company-
specific, not a national registry.  Junk fax recipients must contact each Fax EBR 
sender individually.  See Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(c). 
 159 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-8, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. III 2003)). 
 160 One recent case pointedly shows such company-specific do-not-fax lists are 
not effective.  Covington & Burling, 2003 LEXIS 29, at *2 (noting that, after plaintiff 
asked to be removed from defendant’s lists, plaintiff “received 172 fax advertisements 
for vacation packages . . . and 104 fax advertisements for laser printer supplies. . . .  
[The next day plaintiff] received 147 more fax advertisements for vacation packages”).  
Ironically, the government—as an intervener in a TCPA fax case—has made this exact 
argument against company-specific fax lists.  See Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. 
Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 817 (M.D. La. 2004) (explaining 
government’s contention that do-not-fax lists would not eliminate cost-shifting of 
unwanted faxes, would unfairly burden the consumer to contact each fax advertiser 
and would put the burden on consumers to prove they had requested to be removed 
from a company’s fax marketing list).  In addition to shifting ink and paper costs to 
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Finally, Congress’s “limit” on sources of fax numbers 
contradicts any notion of consumer protection.161  Congress’s 
new definition of EBR limits how an EBR sender can collect the 
fax number of a recipient.  It gives senders two options: either 
collect the number from the recipient within the context of the 
established business relationship or find the number in a 
directory, on a website or any other public place.162  Thus, 
according to the second option, a business which publishes its 
fax number on a website for the purposes of legitimate business 
exposes itself to more unwanted faxes.  This is in direct 
contrast to the TCPA’s purpose of facilitating interstate 
commerce by prohibiting unsolicited faxed advertisements from 
interfering with “legitimate business messages.”163  By allowing 
senders to collect fax numbers outside of the context of the 
established business relationship, Congress has helped make it 
easier for businesses to send unsolicited faxes.  Thus, 
Congress’s version of the Fax EBR in the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act weakens consumer protection instead of enhancing it. 
B. Faxing Deserves Stricter Telemarketing Policies Due to 
Its Unique Technological Features 
As made clear in the legislative history of the TCPA, 
faxing technology deserves a broader ban on marketing than 
other methods due to the technology that sends and receives 
faxes.164   Proponents of the Junk Fax Prevention Act argue 
that the cost-shifting policy is outdated due to improvements in 
faxing technology, but this technology remains largely 
unchanged today in the sense that a fax must still be printed 
  
recipients, do-not-fax lists do not completely prevent unwanted faxes from interrupting 
legitimate messages.  See Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282 F. Supp. 2d  976, 
984 (D. Minn. 2002) (rejecting the creation of a do-not-fax list due to the fact that even 
one unwanted fax “can prevent the receipt of wanted faxes”). 
 161 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(a). 
 162 Id. 
 163 H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at *10. 
 164 See supra text accompanying notes 10, 53 and 58.  Other methods such as 
telephone and email do not present as strong of a case for cost-shifting as faxing.  For 
example, marketing via telephone does not cause paper or ink costs to the called party.  
It is for cost-shifting reasons that cell phones are explicitly banned from calls made 
with autodialing systems or artificial or prerecorded voice programs.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
227 (b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).  For email, a recipient of unwanted email spam controls which 
message to print.  Spam, however, can raise cost-shifting concerns for corporations or 
server owners when the totality of spam overwhelms computer systems.  Adam Zitter, 
Note, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2777 (2004) (noting one recent study reported U.S. 
corporations spend $8.9 billion a year fighting spam). 
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out at a cost—in terms of paper, ink and time—to the 
recipient.165   Defenders of maintaining the Fax EBR also point 
to the fact that modern fax machines are capable of receiving 
and storing in the machine’s memory more than one message, 
and thus there is no interruption of legitimate business faxes 
while an unsolicited faxed advertisement prints.166  This theory 
fails, however, in every-day application due to the disruption 
that occurs as a result of server delays caused by overfilled 
memory.167
This is not to suggest that there has been no 
advancement in terms of faxing technology.  Today, faxes can 
be sent as either an attachment to emails or transmitted to fax 
servers168 or personal computers equipped with modems.  A fax 
sent as an email attachment instead of directly to a fax 
  
 165 The FCC as late as 2003 found that fax machines, although faster in terms 
of processing messages, still required paper to be printed for each message. 2003 FCC 
Memo, supra note 2, at 118-20.  Furthermore, the U.S. government as late as 2002 
defended the constitutionality of the TCPA fax provision by arguing that the law is best 
viewed “as an anti-conversion statute because its purpose is to prevent the shifting of 
advertising costs (paper, toner, human resources, business disruption), from the 
advertiser to the recipient of the advertising.”  Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282 F. 
Supp. 2d at 981. 
 166 See, e.g., Comments of Nextel Communications, In the Matter of Rules and 
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket 
No. 02-278, at 30-31, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native 
_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513396853: 
When the TCPA was passed in 1991, the vast majority of faxes were sent and 
received by stand-alone thermal paper telephone fax machines.  These analog 
devices had no scanning or receiving memory, operated at slow data transfer 
speeds, tied up telephone lines for significant periods of time, and consumed 
expensive thermal paper with every transmission.  These considerations lay 
at the heart of both Congress’ decision to regulate fax advertising and its 
constitutional justification for doing so.  Since the passage of the TCPA, 
however, data transfer speeds have increased and transmission times have 
decreased dramatically.  Plain-paper fax technology has obviated the need for 
costly thermal paper.  Most important, fax modem technology now enables 
the delivery of faxes to email inboxes where consumers can electronically 
retrieve, view or discard a fax image without ever reducing it to paper. 
Id. 
 167 How many pages a fax machine will store in its memory vary from twenty 
to two hundred pages, depending on the model and manufacturer.  Scott Cullen, Fax 
Buying Tips, OFFICE DEALER AND OFFICE SOLUTIONS, Nov. 1, 2003, at 10 (“The number 
of pages a fax can store in memory is based on a standard test page with minimal 
amount of text.  For text or graphics-intensive documents, 200 pages of memory may in 
reality only allow you to store 100 or fewer pages in memory.”).  Courts have also noted 
that modern fax machines are not sufficient to fight the onslaught of junk fax 
transmissions.  See, e.g., Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 653 
(8th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with plaintiff’s argument that technological changes have not 
eliminated burdens imposed on recipients of unwanted fax advertising). 
 168 Fax servers enable multiple computers to send and receive faxes from the 
same or shared number.  2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 119. 
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machine is received instantly, which saves time and cost 
because it allows recipients to see the fax before deciding 
whether to print it.  The FCC, however, in its 2003 memo 
overhauling the TCPA, clarified that its TCPA rules do not 
apply to fax advertisements sent as email attachments,169 so 
faxes sent as email attachments are irrelevant to a TCPA 
analysis. 
According to the same 2003 FCC memo, the TCPA does 
govern faxes sent to “personal computers equipped with, or 
attached to, modems and to computerized fax servers.”170  Some 
businesses contend that fax server and desktop faxing 
technology do not raise the same cost-shifting issue as a 
conventional stand-alone fax machine because not every 
message from a fax server and personal computer is 
automatically printed.171  The FCC disagreed, however, finding 
the totality of harm—the cost of paper and toner if the message 
is printed, the possibility that faxes will tie up modem or fax 
server lines,172 and increased labor costs for monitoring which 
faxes were legitimate—justified subjecting personal computers 
and fax servers to TCPA regulations.173  Further, and more 
persuasively, the FCC argued that there is no way to indicate 
which type of faxing technology the recipient owns.174  There is 
no distinction in the numerical coding of fax numbers to 
indicate whether a fax sent to a recipient will go to a fax server 
or a traditional, cost-shifting machine.175   
  
 169 Id. at 119 n.736 (noting that this type of transmission does not fit the 
definition of ‘telephone facsimile machine’ at 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2)). 
 170 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 119. 
 171 Id. (“Nextel maintains that such faxes do not implicate the harms that 
Congress sought to redress in the TCPA, as they are not reduced to paper can be 
deleted from one’s inbox without being opened or examined.”). 
 172 See, e.g., Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers. 
Commc’ns., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 815 (M.D. La. 2004) (noting faxes sent directly to 
email systems burden business’s computer networks); Covington & Burling v. Int’l 
Mktg. & Research, Inc., No. 01-0004360, 2003 LEXIS 29, at *9-10 (D.C. Super. Apr. 17, 
2003) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s incurred no costs because 
plaintiff did not print out faxes) (“[T]he critical fact is that Covington’s fax server was 
unavailable to receive or transmit other faxes.  Covington’s memorandum and 
affidavits in support of their summary judgment motion are persuasive that attorneys 
and staff at Covington reported delays in sending or receiving faxes on the dates in 
question.”).  Sometimes more than the modem or sever is tied up.  In one recent case, a 
man’s whole computer became inoperable due to the deluge of unwanted faxed 
advertisements sent to his computer modem.  Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns & Mktg., 282 
F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (D. Minn. 2002). 
 173 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 120. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id.  See Kaufman v. ACS Sys., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 317-18 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(rejecting defendant’s argument that faxing technology outdates the TCPA cost-shifting 
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Thus, the cost-shifting arguments for a broad ban 
against unsolicited fax advertisements remain relevant and 
persuasive, even in light of modern fax technological 
developments and trends.  
C. Having Weak Federal Interstate Protection Will Undo 
Any Strong Intrastate Protection Of Faxes 
A main motivation behind the TCPA was to close up the 
jurisdictional gap state telemarketing laws could not reach.176  
The TCPA explicitly does not preempt any state law that is 
more restrictive than the TCPA.177  In essence, the TCPA 
creates a minimum floor of protection for telemarketing 
legislation.  Some states did not create intrastate junk fax laws 
after the TCPA was enacted.178  At least one state even 
repealed its junk fax law because it was unnecessary in light of 
the TCPA’s initial strict prohibition against all faxes.179  The 
Junk Fax Prevention Act did not amend the TCPA’s minimum 
floor preemption provision.180  Thus, for states with strong anti-
junk fax laws,181 the Junk Fax Act Prevention Act severely 
undermines these efforts because marketers will simply move 
their faxing across state borders to trigger the weaker 
interstate protection. 
D. Congress Should Have Deferred or Given More Weight to 
the FCC’s Determination to Get Rid of the Fax EBR 
The junk fax debate is understandably framed in terms 
of consumer needs versus business needs.  It can also be easily 
  
needs because defendant presented no evidence of how many people actually use the 
fancy technology). 
 176 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1970 (1991). 
 177 47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2000).  In contrast, the Can-Spam Act preempted all 
state laws involving email spam.  Can-Spam Act, supra note 3, § 8 (“This Act 
supersedes any statute, regulation or rule of a State . . . that expressly regulates the 
use of electronic mail to send commercial messages[.]”). 
 178 For example, Iowa currently does not have a law regulating junk fax 
within the state of Iowa. 
 179 See infra discussion in Part VI.  
 180 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 21 (2005). 
 181 For instance, Florida’s statute prohibits all intrastate junk faxes regardless 
of any EBR between sender and recipient.  See FLA. STAT. § 365.1657(1) (1997) (“It is 
unlawful for any person to use a machine that electronically transmits facsimiles of 
documents through connection with a telephone network to transmit within this state 
unsolicited advertising material for the sale of any real property, goods or services.”).  
The broad ban is similar to the original text of the TCPA.  See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 
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viewed as a separation of powers struggle.  Congress created 
the TCPA with strict prohibition against faxes, but granted the 
FCC the authority to implement its necessary rules.182  The 
FCC erroneously created a Fax EBR, which it later sought to 
overturn.183  Congress, unhappy with this decision to eliminate 
the Fax EBR, enacted the Junk Fax Prevention Act.184  This 
action serves as a reminder to the FCC that while the agency’s 
rulings have the force of law, Congress gave them the power to 
promulgate rules in the first place.185  Despite Congress’s 
position as authorizing law maker, Congress should have 
deferred more to the FCC’s decision to eliminate the Fax EBR.  
First, the FCC had more time to study and consider the 
Fax EBR effect, both as part of the comment process186 and in 
its various TCPA fines and cases,187 since the Fax EBR’s 
establishment in 1992.  In contrast, the Senate had two weeks 
of hearings in April 2005; the House had none.188  It is likely 
that Congress moved the bill faster than it should have due to 
the impending FCC deadline of July 1, 2005.189  
Second, it remains questionable whether codifying the 
Fax EBR was necessary to meet Congress’s true motivation in 
rushing the Junk Fax Prevention Act.  The 2003 FCC memo 
announced two separate rule changes: (1) the elimination of the 
Fax EBR and (2) consent to fax would need to be written, 
signed and collected prior to a faxing campaign.190  
Notwithstanding the codification of the Fax EBR, the 
legislative history primarily posits the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act as legislation to prohibit the costs of obtaining prior written 
consent for businesses.191  So it seems very possible that 
  
 182 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 
 183 See supra discussion in Part III. 
 184 See supra discussion in Part IV. 
 185 Congress created the FCC as part of the 1934 Communications Act.  See 
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html. 
 186 FCC, FCC 02-250, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE 
TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991: NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING 
3 (2002) (seeking comment on upcoming TCPA review). 
 187 See http://www.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/ufax.html for listing of recent TCPA 
forfeitures and notices of apparent liability for unsolicited faxes. 
 188 See http://thomas.loc.gov (enter S. 714.ENR for bill number, and then click 
on Congressional Record References for a history of the bill as passed).  
 189 See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. 
 190 2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 112-13. 
 191 See S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 6 (1991) (“This legislation is designed to permit 
legitimate businesses to do business . . . without the burden of collecting prior written 
permission to send these recipients commercial faxes.”); id. (noting that that trade 
associations “would be saddled with a huge burden to collect signatures from each 
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Congress could have respected the FCC’s Fax EBR elimination 
but overturned the written consent requirement.  Arguably, 
Congress could have limited its TCPA amendment to its 
adjustment of what consent meant in the definition of 
“unsolicited advertisement,” which after the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act reads “prior express invitation or permission, in 
writing or otherwise” instead of the previous “prior express 
invitation or permission.”192   In regards to the specific “writing 
or otherwise” change, the Senate Report states: “[t]he effect of 
this amendment would be to statutorily prohibit the FCC from 
promulgating a rule that would require prior express 
permission to be secured only in writing.”193  If Congress had 
deferred to the FCC by allowing the Fax EBR to expire but had 
changed consent to mean written or verbal, it would have 
created a better balance between consumer and business needs.   
VI. FATE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION AND JUNK FAXES  
With the passing of the Junk Fax Prevention Act, 
businesses have a clear authorization to send junk faxes based 
on an established business relationship.194  In response to the 
cost and privacy concerns of this new law, consumer advocates 
are likely to focus on other avenues of change, including 
mandated annual Congressional reports on junk faxes, the 
possibility of a national do-not-fax registry, and state 
legislatures reacting with stronger telemarketing statutes.  
However, this Note argues these options are ineffective 
solutions for prohibiting unfair cost-shifting from advertiser to 
consumer, which is arguably the most important policy reason 
for the ban against junk faxing. 
Junk faxes essentially act as a “postage-due” tax on 
consumers.  This is true whether a person receives 500 junk 
faxes or if a person receives one.  Thus, merely reducing the 
number of junk faxes to a more manageable level by allowing 
only unsolicited fax advertisements sent based on an 
  
member just to send an unsolicited fax advertisement.”); id. at 8 (“If this bill were 
enacted, it would eliminate the requirement to obtain written permission from 
customers[.]”); 151 CONG. REC. H5265 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Green) (“This new law will prevent businesses and realtors from having to fill out 
paperwork to communicate with each other about an existing business relationship.”). 
 192 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(g). (emphasis added).  Compare 
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (2000), with Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(g). 
 193 S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 11-12. 
 194 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 2(a). 
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established business relationship is not a victory for 
consumers.  To truly protect consumers from unwarranted 
costs, a ban on faxed advertisements sent without permission 
must be a complete ban, as it was when Congress passed the 
TCPA in 1991.  Thus, Congress should eliminate the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act’s statutory Fax EBR exemption. 
A. Future Congressional Review Under the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act 
Perhaps as a silent nod to the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act’s inherent imbalance between business and consumer 
needs, Congress included an order in the legislation that there 
be future studies on the enforcement of junk faxing.  This order 
required an annual FCC report195 and a study by the 
Comptroller General of the United States to be completed nine 
months after enactment.196  In the original TCPA, Congress did 
not include any annual review of faxing.197
The Junk Fax Prevention Act’s future studies require 
several things.  First, the annual FCC report requires the 
agency to report the number of complaints, citations and 
notices of apparent liability regarding the junk fax provision.  
Specifically, Congress is interested in considering how much 
time passes between a consumer’s complaint and notice of 
liability,198 as well as how effectively the FCC recovers 
monetary penalties.199  The Junk Fax Prevention Act also 
requires the General Comptroller of the United States to 
complete a study on how the FCC handles its junk fax 
enforcement.200  Specifically, the law requires the Comptroller 
to examine the impact and adequacy of existing statutory 
remedies on both senders and recipients of junk faxes.201  By 
  
 195 Id. § 3(g). 
 196 Id. § 4(a), (c). 
 197 See 47 U.S.C. § 227. 
 198 Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5, § 3(g)(4)(c).  This “time between” 
issue is very relevant to consumer protection because the longer the FCC waits to 
address the complaint, the greater number unsolicited faxes the complaining consumer 
is likely to receive, and thus, the higher the costs consumer is likely to incur. 
 199 Id. § 3(g)(5)-(8). 
 200 Id. § 4(a).  The GAO will study how the FCC receives and investigates 
complaints, the level of enforcement success the FCC achieves, and whether the FCC is 
adequately enforcing complaints, among other things.  Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3). 
 201 Id. § 4(b).  In April 2006, the General Comptroller’s office released its first 
report to Congress.  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: WEAKNESS IN PROCEDURES AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
HINDER JUNK FAX ENFORCEMENT, GAO-06-425 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
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adding this additional level of supervision—the Comptroller 
will essentially be checking the FCC’s checking—Congress 
indicates an unease that the bill it passed might not be the 
most effective solution.  While it is established jurisprudential 
rhetoric that Congress does not have to hit the bulls-eye 
perfectly when enacting legislation,202  it seems Congress is 
passing off the tough work—finding a true balance between 
consumer and business needs in regards to junk fax 
regulation—to some future Congressional session down the 
line, all in exchange for helping lobbying businesses beat an 
FCC deadline.203  
These Congressional studies on junk faxes are an 
ineffective solution to prohibit cost to consumers for two 
reasons.  First, in order to see a trend in cost to consumers, 
Congress will likely need at least two annual reports to 
compare, which means any legislative adjustment based on 
these annual reports will probably not be a possibility in the 
near future.  In the meantime, businesses will continue to 
expose consumers to unwarranted costs by faxing unsolicited 
advertisements pursuant to an established business 
relationship.  Second, by ordering an annual report, there is 
simply no guarantee that the results of these reports will lead 
to legislative adjustment.  Thus, consumer advocates cannot 
effectively rely on future Congressional studies to prevent cost-
shifting. 
B. A National Do-Not-Fax Registry  
For years, when challenging the constitutionality of 
TCPA’s strict prohibition on unsolicited faxed advertisements, 
defendants often pointed to creating a do-not-fax registry as a 
solution.204  They argued that such a list would allow 
  
new.items/d06425.pdf.  The report reveals that the immense increase in junk fax 
complaints—from 2,200 in 2001 to 46,000 in 2005—is outpacing the FCC’s ability to 
manage and address these complaints.  Id. at 2. 
 202 See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co. 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993) (“Nor 
do we require that the Government make progress on every front before it can make 
progress on any front.”); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Congress may 
reduce the volume of intrusive telemarketing calls without completely eliminating the 
calls.”). 
 203 See supra discussion in Part IV.A.  See also 151 CONG REC. H5264 (daily 
ed. June 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Upton) (thanking the House for “expedite 
consideration” because June 30 is “when the sands of the hourglass were about to run 
out”). 
 204 See, e.g., Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers. 
Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 816-17 (M.D. La. 2004); Minn. v. Sunbelt Commc’ns & 
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consumers to control the messages sent via fax and would give 
legitimate marketers the ability to send some unsolicited 
messages via fax to consumers who have not signed their fax 
numbers to the registry.205  As stated above, the Junk Fax 
Prevention Act’s company-specific do-not-fax list, which 
requires consumers to contact each company individually to opt 
out of future unsolicited messages, does not prohibit costs to 
the consumers and unfairly shifts the burden to consumers.206  
In response, consumers are likely to push for a national do-not-
fax registry.207
When shaping any future rules for a national do-not-fax 
registry, Congress and the FCC would likely consider the 
recent rules authorizing the enactment of a do-not-call 
registry.208  The National Do-Not-Call Registry is a joint effort 
between the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).209  
The registry allows consumers to register their residential 
  
Mktg., 282 F. Supp. 2d 976, 984 (D. Minn. 2002); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. 
Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1997). 
 205 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 206 See supra discussion in Part IV. 
 207 The strong, positive political response to the do-not-call registry led 
Congress to include a provision in the Can-Spam Act that would allow for the 
establishment of a national do-not-email registry.  Adam Zitter, Note, Good Laws for 
Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2767, 2770 (2004).  But the FTC later ruled that it would not establish a federal do-not-
email opt-out system due to problems with effectiveness and enforcement.  FTC Places 
“Do Not Email” Registry Plan on Hold, ELEC. COMMERCE NEWS, Vol. 9, No. 13, June 
21, 2004.  Some commercial speech commentators note that this national registry trend 
continues to inhibit a marketer’s ability to reach consumers in a cost-effective way.  
Kavita Amar and Bruce E.H. Johnson, The Rights of Telemarketers, Faxers and 
Spammers are Subordinated to the Rights of Consumers, 811 PLI/Pat 85 (November 
2004). 
 208 For a comprehensive examination of the issue, see 2003 FCC Memo, supra 
note 2, at 14-51.  The TCPA as originally enacted authorized the FCC to consider a 
nationwide do-not-call registry. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (2000).  As part of its initial rule-
making, the FCC declined to adopt a nationwide list. 1992 FCC Memo, supra note 20, 
at 7-10.  
  In 2003, the FTC amended its 1995 Telemarketing Sales Rule such that it 
was an abusive telemarketing practice for a commercial telemarketer to call an 
individual on a national do-not-call registry.  Jack Gravelle, Note, Hold the Phone: 
Making the Call For “Personal Exceptions” to the Do-Not-Call Registry, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 
991, 1002 (2004).  Many questioned the FTC’s authorization to create such a registry.  
Id. at 1003.  To quell this objection, Congress passed the National Do-Not-Call 
Implementation Act, which authorized the FTC to collect fees to implement and enforce 
a national do-not-call registry.  Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 1006 (2003) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 6101 (Supp. III 2003)).  The bill also required the FCC to issue final rules 
regarding its Telephone Consumer Protection Act and to harmonize its do-not-call rules 
with the FTC.  Id.  President Bush signed the bill into law on March 11, 2003.  
National Briefing Washington: Bush Signs Do-Not-Call Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2003, at A20. 
209
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telephone number, including wireless numbers.210  Once on the 
list, businesses may not make any interstate or intrastate 
telemarketing calls to that number for the next five years.  
There are some exceptions to the ban on calls, including an 
established business relationship exception.211  Once the five 
years have passed, a consumer may re-enter the number on the 
list.212  A consumer can remove his or her number from the do-
not-call registry at any time.213   
One year after enacting the registry, the FTC reported 
that the registry had been effective in greatly reducing the 
number of telemarketing calls.  For instance, one survey 
conducted by a market research firm found that ninety-two 
percent of adults who had signed up had fewer phone calls and 
that twenty-five percent of adults who had signed up received 
absolutely no phone calls.214  Further, only less than one 
  
  2003 FCC Memo, supra note 2, at 24 (“We conclude that the national 
database should allow for the registration of wireless telephone numbers . . . .”). 
210
  Id. at 29-32.  Other exemptions include commercial calls from charities and 
political support groups.  Id. at 53.  This distinction between commercial calls based on 
the subject matter of the call led to a Colorado district court ruling that the Do-Not-
Call registry violated the First Amendment.  Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 
283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168 (D. Colo. 2003) (holding the Do-Not-Call registry is a 
content-based regulation and violates the First Amendment), stay denied by 284 F. 
Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 358 
F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).  A few months later, the Tenth Circuit held the registry 
constitutional.  See 358 F.3d 1228, 1242 (holding the registry to be narrowly tailored 
without over-regulating protected speech). 
211
  See “Q&A: The National Do-Not-Call Registry,” http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
conline/pubs/alerts/dncalrt.htm. 
212
  See id.  By creating an opt-out system, the government avoids First 
Amendment problems because the consumer becomes the censor, while the government 
is merely facilitating consumer choice.  See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d 1228 at 1233 
(“The national do-not-call registry offers consumers a tool with which they can protect 
their homes against intrusions that Congress has determined to be particularly 
invasive.”).  See also Rodney A. Smolla, The “Do-Not-Call List” Controversy: A Parable 
of Privacy and Speech, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 743, 756 (2005).  Many view the do-not-
call registry as a triumph of consumer choice.  See, e.g., id. at 757 (“Do-Not-Call is not a 
paternalistic usurping of consumer choice; it is an empowerment of consumer choice, in 
aid of the tranquility of the home.”).  One commentator, however, argues that the 
facilitation of consumer choice theory is only relevant when the government “present[s] 
the public with a vast array of options,” something the commenter feels ‘opt-out’ 
systems that discriminate based on subject matter, such as the registry, do not provide 
because the registry does not allow consumers to opt-out of political and charity 
telemarketers.  See Zitter, Note, supra note 207, at 2814-16 (2004). 
213
  FTC, Annual Report to Congress for FY 2003 and 2004 Pursuant to the Do 
Not Call Implementation Act on Implementation of the National Do Not Call Registry 
4 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/donotcall/051004dncfy0304.pdf.  
Another survey, conducted by Customer Care Alliance between February and April 
2004, showed that sixty percent of respondents who had registered their primary home 
telephone number reported that they had experienced an eighty percent reduction in 
the number of telemarketing calls.  Id. 
214
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percent of the numbers registered filed complaints about the 
registry’s effectiveness.215  By the end of the 2004 fiscal year, 
consumers registered sixty-four million numbers.216  While 
consumers celebrated, telemarketing associations decried the 
national registry for its negative financial impact on the 
industry and the potential for abuse and misuse of the registry 
contents.217
Despite the positive consumer feedback for a federal do-
not-call list, a similar national do-not-fax list is an 
inappropriate solution for faxed advertisements.218  First, the 
do-not-call registry exempts calls based on established business 
relationships.219  Faxing technology’s unique cost-shifting 
features make established business relationship exemptions 
unfairly burdensome and costly on fax machine owners.220  
Second, the do-not-call registry allows only residential phone 
numbers to be listed.221  This would not address the problems of 
junk faxes interfering with business owners’ fax machines, 
which become unavailable for receiving and sending legitimate 
business faxes due to invading junk faxes.  Finally, by creating 
a list of do-not-fax numbers, Congress would be sending the 
message that non-registered fax numbers are free targets for 
fax solicitations.  Such a message would be contrary to the cost 
and privacy policies of the TCPA’s original blanket ban on 
unsolicited faxed advertisements.222  Thus, a national do-not-
fax registry similar to the national do-not-call registry would 
not prevent cost-shifting. 
C. State Response to the Junk Fax Prevention Act 
The junk fax fight started in the states,223 so it is not 
surprising that is where the junk fax fight will continue.  There 
  
  Id. 215
  Id. 216
  Gravelle, Note, supra note 209, at 1007-09.  For example, the telephone 
numbers of several executives of the Direct Marketing Association were fraudulently 
added to the list without the executives’ knowledge.  Id. at 1008. 
217
  Courts have rejected defendants’ arguments that a federal do-not-fax list is 
a better legislative solution than the TCPA junk fax ban.  Accounting Outsourcing, 
L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns, 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 816-17 (M.D. La. 
2004); Destination Ventures Ltd. v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632, 639 (D. Or. 1994). 
218
  See FTC, OFFICE OF CONSUMER & BUS. EDUC., supra note 212, at 5-6. 219
  See supra discussion in Part V.B. 220
  See FTC, OFFICE OF CONSUMER & BUS. EDUC., supra note 212, at 3.  221
  See supra discussion in Part II.B. 222
  See supra notes 33-35 about pre-TCPA state laws. 223
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is concern that the federal Junk Fax Prevention Act weakens 
state protection.  California, for instance, recently enacted new 
legislation in response to the Junk Fax Prevention Act that 
would affect faxes coming into and out of the state.224  State 
legislation, such as this, likely violates the Supremacy 
Clause,225 and thus, is an ineffective solution for the junk fax 
problem. 
In 1991, while the TCPA was being formed, the 
California legislature enacted a bill against intrastate junk 
faxes as a stop gap measure until a federal law emerged.226  
When the TCPA became law, it was more restrictive than the 
California bill,227 so, per the TCPA, the federal law preempted 
the California law.228  In 2002, realizing it had what was 
essentially a useless law on the books, the California 
legislature repealed its state junk fax law.229  Thus, the state 
saw the TCPA’s broad prohibition against faxing as sufficient 
protection.230   
That protection significantly changed after the passing 
of the Junk Fax Prevention Act.  California responded by 
introducing new legislation in 2005 that would reinstate the 
original level of protection found in the TCPA’s strict ban on 
unsolicited faxed advertisements.231  On October 7, 2005, 
  
  2005-667 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering). 224
  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
225
  1992-564 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering). 226
  The 1992 California statute allowed junk faxing “as long as the sender 
provided a toll-free number on the fax and honored any request by a recipient to be 
removed from the fax advertising list.”  Unsolicited Fax Advertising: Hearing on SB 
833 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 2 (Cal. 2005), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_833_cfa_20050408_165850_sen 
_comm.html [hereinafter Senate Bill Analysis].  By contrast, the TCPA as enacted 
strictly prohibited the sending of unsolicited advertisements via fax, whether or not a 
toll-free opt-out number was included on the fax. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000).  
227
  See 47 U.S.C. § 227(e). 228
  2002-700 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering); Senate Bill Analysis, supra 
note 227, at 2 (“Although it took the Legislature almost 10 years to repeal California’s 
weaker opt-out junk fax advertising law, the opt-in TCPA has been the law in the state 
since 2002.”). 
229
  2002-700 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 1. 230
  Senate Bill Analysis, supra note 227, at 2 (noting that Congress was 
considering “a loophole in the TCPA [that] . . . [t]he author believes . . . if enacted 
would reinstate the opt-out approach to junk faxing [in the 1991 California fax law] 
and make the federal law nearly impossible to enforce. . . .  In this way no matter what 
Congress does to [the] TCPA, California citizens will be protected”). 
231
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Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law SB 833, 
which prohibited all unsolicited faxed advertisements—with or 
without an established business relationship.232  The bill 
defined an unsolicited advertisement as an ad sent without a 
recipient’s “prior express invitation or permission.”233  What 
made this bill remarkable, though, is the fact that the strict 
prohibition applied if either the recipient or the sender is 
located in California.234  Thus, California essentially enacted a 
bill affecting both intrastate and interstate communication of 
faxes entering or leaving the state.  The legislature sent a clear 
message to Congress that interstate protection under the Junk 
Fax Prevention Act is too weak to protect the state’s 
consumers.235  Ironically, the federal government’s key reason 
for establishing a federal telemarketing law in 1991 was to 
protect states.236   
Critics of the California law soon questioned whether 
the Junk Fax Prevention Act would preempt the law’s 
restrictions on interstate faxes.237  A week before the California 
law’s enactment date of January 1, 2006, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, in conjunction with a blast-fax service company, 
filed a federal lawsuit to oppose the law.238  The U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce sought a declaratory judgment that the federal 
junk fax law preempted the unconstitutional California junk 
  
  Governor Puts a Wrap on Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at B4. 232
  2005-667 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (Deering). 233
  Id. (“It is unlawful for a person or entity, if either the person or entity or the 
recipient is located within California, to use any telephone facsimile machine, 
computer, or other device to send . . . an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone 
facsimile machine.”) (emphasis added). 
234
  For California Senator Debra Bowen’s remarks to the American Chronicle, 
see President Bush to Junk Faxers: Start Your Engines, AM. CHRON., July 11, 2005, 
available at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=1093 
(“Thanks to Congress and the President, marketers can now legally hijack people’s fax 
machines and turn them into their own personal printing presses. . . .  The silver lining 
of the new law is it doesn’t prevent states from passing stronger laws and we need to 
take advantage of that opening.  We need a strong state junk fax ban to prevent 
Californians from getting stuck paying for sales pitches they didn’t ask for and don’t 
want.”).  
235
  See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.  236
  The Junk Fax Prevention Act did not affect the TCPA provision that stated 
the federal law had no preemptive effect on more restrictive state laws.  See generally 
237
Junk Fax Prevention Act, supra note 5.
 238 Lynda Gledhill, ‘Wasted Year’ Laws Take Effect; Measures on Faxes, Video 
Games Held Up by Court Decisions, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 2006, at B1.  The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce won an injunction that stayed the state law until a judge could 
consider the Chamber of Commerce’s case.  Id. 
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fax law.239  In February 2006, an Eastern District of California 
judge ruled that the California law’s interstate junk fax 
restriction violated the Supremacy Clause and was preempted 
by federal law.  The law died before ever taking effect.  Thus, 
protecting consumers through stronger state junk fax laws 
affecting interstate faxes is an ineffective solution due to their 
questionable constitutionality. 
Therefore, future Congressional studies, a national-do-
not-fax registry and stronger state laws affecting interstate 
faxes offer inadequate protection for consumers against cost-
shifting.  If Congress truly wants to prevent economic injury, 
then it should eliminate the Fax EBR and reinstate its 
complete ban on unsolicited fax advertisements sent without 
express permission, as set out in the TCPA as enacted. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Junk Fax Prevention Act undermines 
the strict prohibition against junk faxing set out in the TCPA.  
In rushing to meet the FCC’s expiration of the Fax EBR, 
Congress overlooked well-established consumer protection 
policies of privacy and cost-shifting.  Additionally, Congress 
disregarded the FCC’s experience with studying TCPA fax 
issues and effectively weakened strong state protection against 
junk faxing already in place.  In order to sufficiently protect 
consumers from unwarranted costs, Congress should reinstate 
a complete ban on unsolicited faxed advertisements sent 
without permission or consent. 
It is an understatement to assert that there is a lot of 
consumer dissatisfaction with telemarketing methods.  In an 
informative—but completely unscientific—online survey, Time 
Magazine asked its website readers to nominate “The 100 
Worst Ideas” of the twentieth century.240  Telemarketing was 
ranked fourth on the list, behind only prohibition, the computer 
programming choice that led to the Y2K bug and Geraldo 
Rivera’s decision to open the vault of Al Capone.241  Despite 
these strong feelings against telemarketing, it is extremely 
  
 239 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, No. 2:05-CV-2257-MCE-
KJM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8324, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006). 
 240 The 100 Worst Ideas of the Century, TIME, Jan. 19, 2000, http://www.time. 
com/time/time100/worstideas.html. 
 241 Id.  Telemarketing held a clear victory over other suggested worst ideas of 
the century, including appetite-suppressant Fen-Phen, the crop chemical DDT, and 
Ishtar, the much maligned Warren Beatty-Dustin Hoffman comedy.  Id. 
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important to remember that advertisers have First 
Amendment protection, limited though it may be.  This Note 
does not challenge a legitimate marketer’s ability to share a 
commercial message with consumers.  It simply questions the 
wisdom of doing so by a method that, due to its unique 
technological architecture, shifts costs to consumers and 
interrupts legitimate business with each unsolicited 
commercial message sent.  By passing the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act and codifying the established business relationship for 
faxes, Congress has authorized marketers to do just that.  
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